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1. Introduction 
The pursuit of a low carbon energy mix is leading to a rise in variable renewable 
energy sources, most notably wind and solar. The unpredictability of these sources 
will cause energy flow fluctuations in the network inducing a greater stress for the 
grid and, therefore, increasing the need for flexibility.  
                                            
1 Corresponding Author. 
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Electrical energy storage (EES) is a technically feasible technology as proved in 
multiple grid applications. EES can increase the reliability and resilience of the 
network and deliver energy more efficiently. However, its high capital costs and 
various market and regulatory barriers are hindering the required deployment of the 
technology.  
Whereas the EES sector is progressing quickly in California, in Europe it is stuck at 
this moment. This paper aims to clarify why the prospects for energy storage in 
Europe are not as good as they are in California. The UK, Germany and Spain are 
the countries chosen as generally representative of the European situation. The 
market and regulatory framework in California and Europe are analysed critically, 
and changes to overcome the main barriers are recommended. 
There are currently2 1311 energy storage projects under operation, in construction or 
announced in the world. Regarding GWs installed, pumped hydro storage (PHS) 
accounts for more than 96% of the power installed worldwide. PHS is a mature 
technology, historically coupled with large baseload power plants that can be sized 
up to 4GW (EPRI, 2010).  
This article is focused on distributed storage at level of the distribution grid. We focus 
on electrochemical batteries (i.e. Lead-acid, Li-ion, NaS and flow batteries) because 
these are able to perform most of the required grid services (DOE, 2013, p. 29). By 
                                            
2 The total power installed is around 186GW. Electrochemical batteries account for more than half of 
the projects, followed by Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS). The USA (525 projects) is leading the 
deployment of energy storage, followed by China (96) and Japan (89). In Europe, Germany (67) and 
Spain (65) are the countries with the highest number of installations. The source of all data presented 
below is the database developed by the Department of Energy of the USA (DOE) which provides up-
to-date information about grid-connected EES projects worldwide. 
(http://www.energystorageexchange.org/). Data provided updated and accessed in October 2015. 
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contrast bulk storage systems such as PHS and compressed air storage (CAES) 
produce a narrower range of system benefits. 
Electrochemical batteries will most likely dominate the grid EES market during the 
next decade since: 
- they can provide multiple services and therefore potentially access to several 
revenue sources, 
- they have reached a sufficient level of maturity to be commercially operated 
(SBC, 2013), and, 
- a strong decrease in the costs of these installations is expected (Rocky 
Mountain Institute, 2015b).  
There are currently (end of October 2015) 706 electrochemical battery projects 
around the world operating or announced. The following table shows the number of 
electrochemical battery projects in each of the jurisdictions analysed: 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Our methodology is based on a literature review and interviews with industrial 
stakeholders. Firstly, the main barriers were identified by analysing several reports 
published by different industrial stakeholders (regulators, utilities, developers and 
consultancy firms). Interviews with people inside the EES sector were conducted to 
find out directly the major problems they are facing. The main companies contacted 
were: UKPN in the UK, Younicos in Germany, Abengoa in Spain or Energy 
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Strategies Group in the USA. Based on the published documentation and our 
interviews we propose a number of recommendations and actions. 
Section 2 looks at the market drivers for EES. Section 3 examines sources of 
revenue for EES and section 4 outlines the value of EES to the system. Section 5 
goes on to discuss the market and regulatory barriers to further deployment of EES. 
Section 6 asks why the prospects for EES are generally better in California than in 
Europe, and section 7 concludes with what might be done to improve the prospects 
for EES in Europe. 
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2. Market drivers for electrical energy storage  
The key drivers that, according to Lyons (2015), indicate that EES will be an 
essential technology for the future power system are:  
Increasing need for flexibility: Large-scale integration of VRES induces 
uncertainty in the planning and operation of the electricity system. The 
unpredictability of these sources will produce energy flow fluctuations that have to be 
mitigated. System operators must match supply and demand. Traditionally, this has 
been done with controllable power plant units to regulate real and reactive power up 
and down. Nowadays, with the penetration of renewable energies, there are higher 
levels of non-controllable (or expensive to control) generation resources.3 As such 
generation sources increase, more regulation and operating reserves, frequency 
control and start-up services will be required. For instance, the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO) has identified a need for additional ramping 
capacity to allow the proper integration of increasing amounts of renewables into the 
grid. Under the scenario of 33% of renewable energies by 2020 legislated in 
California, a need for 4.6GW of flexible capacity to integrate new VRES is forecast 
(Casey, 2011).  
                                            
3 There are examples of operational problems as a consequence of large variations of VRES. In 
2008, an unexpected 1.4GW drop in wind-power generation coincided with an unexpected load 
increase and the loss of a conventional generator in Texas. This forced the Electric Reliability Council 
of Texas to take emergency steps and cut 1.1GW firm load to restore the system frequency (Du and 
Lu, 2015, p.3). 
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Declining cost and increasing use of solar PV: The sharp decrease in the cost of 
PV installations – the cost of PV modules has decreased by one order of magnitude 
from 2008 (Lyons, 2015) – will accentuate the need for flexibility and make solar-
plus-battery systems more attractive. The combination of both technologies can 
maximise the value obtained from them by optimising the operation of the whole 
system. These systems reduce the interactions with the grid, allowing reduced 
import from the grid for final users and reduced exposure for stand-alone generators 
to export curtailment when the grid is congested. The global market for solar-plus-
batteries could reach US$ 2.8 billion by 2018, which will be a boon for the EES 
sector (Lux Research, 2013).  
Decreasing cost of EES installations: The use of storage technologies in other 
industries, such as Li-ion in electric vehicles and electronic portable devices, is one 
of the main drivers for the declining cost of the technology. California’s mandate for 
the installation of 1.325GW of energy storage systems is a further boost for the 
industry. Although this is a location specific policy, this will reduce the cost of the 
technology, which will affect every market. The price of Li-ion batteries has halved 
every 2.5 years since 2009 and several reports forecast that the price of EES 
installations will continue going down (e.g. Rocky Mountain Institute, 2015b).  
Although the cost of battery cells may continue at the same rate of decrease, the 
complete system cost is not likely to come down as fast. Non-battery costs – related 
to grid connection, inverter, management system and contingency – account for 
around 60% of the total cost at a storage facility (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2015a).  
Increased security and reliability concerns due to natural disasters: Hurricane 
Sandy resulted in 8.5 million people being without power in 21 states and caused US 
$65bn in damage, and took the lives of 117 people in the USA. Nick Chaset (2013), 
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California Governor’s Special Advisor for Distributed Generation, Energy Storage 
and Combined Heat and Power, proposed distributed generation combined with 
energy storage as a way to enhance the future resiliency of the grid.  
The way in which the traditional centralised system failed after the hurricane 
increased the interest in microgrids as a way of increasing the reliability of the 
system after facing natural disasters. Energy storage can be represented as an 
investment in microgrid enabling technology options (Lyons, 2015). 
Increased risk of fossil fuel-based investments: Ceres (2012) has evaluated the 
risk of new generation resources. The outcome of the study shows a lower risk in 
practically every category of risk they identify (including exposure to fuel costs, new 
regulation, carbon pricing, water shortages) for VRES compared to alternative 
technologies such as nuclear, biomass or thermal energy with carbon capture and 
sequestration technology. This implies a larger investment in VRES in the medium 
and long term. Such a general trend implies a favourable background for VRES 
enabling EES investments. 
3. Main sources of revenue of EES and additional benefits to the grid 
EES systems can provide multiple services at different stages of the electricity 
system – generation, transmission, distribution and final consumer. The primary 
applications and main sources of revenue for EES installations are4,5:  
                                            
4 A description of all applications can be found in the electricity storage handbook by the DOE and 
EPRI (2013). 
5 The names of the applications can vary from one location to another. We use those terms common 
in the USA. 
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Load following: EES systems can vary their output to balance generation and load 
within a specific region. Electricity is stored when demand is low and discharged 
during periods of peak demand. This can be done over various timescales – from 
minutes to whole days.  
Price arbitrage: EES systems can take advantage of price variations on the 
wholesale market over the day. Price arbitrage consists in charging (i.e. buying or 
not exporting energy) the battery when the electricity price is low and then 
discharging (selling) it when the price is high. This application complements load 
following as low and high price periods coincide with low and peak demand periods 
respectively.  
Supply capacity: This involves using the storage facility to provide reserve capacity 
to the grid at peak times. This involves having the facility ready to discharge at those 
times, in a similar way to conventional back-up fossil fuel generation. 
Transmission and distribution (T&D) investment deferral: EES systems can be 
installed to defer the installation or upgrade of T&D lines or substations where grid 
capacity is being reached. 
Ancillary services: Fast-response energy storage can inject or withdraw energy 
from the grid within a few seconds to maintain the frequency and the voltage within 
the technical limits to avoid instability and blackouts. The most common ancillary 
services are: frequency regulation, voltage control, spinning reserve and black start. 
Renewable integration: Renewable resources are unpredictable and do not align 
with typical peak load patterns. Having a storage device will allow the storage and 
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discharge of renewable generation, facilitating increased shares of renewable energy 
in the total energy mix, in line with renewable energy and carbon reduction targets. 
Apart from the capability to provide these services, EES gives other advantages to 
the whole power system compared to traditional flexibility providers: 
Situation of the plant: EES systems can be sited closer to the loads. They face 
fewer site constraints as they are silent, scalable and do not produce any emissions. 
Gas-fired peaker plants usually work at partial load, which increases their unit CO2, 
NOx, and CO emissions. Therefore, they easily violate air quality minimum 
requirements to be installed in urban areas (Lyons, 2014). Hence, a gas-fired peaker 
plant must be sited away from demand centres which means further from the loads. 
This increases line losses. Therefore, using EES instead of gas-fired peaker plants 
reduces losses in the lines and, at the same time, improves air quality substantially. 
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Planning: Siting, permitting and installation is much faster in the case of EES. 
Modularity makes batteries easy to install. An EES system can complete the whole 
process and be commissioned in 1.5 years. However, in the case of a combustion 
gas turbine, this time can be up to 5 years. This reduces the riskiness of the 
investment and increases the flexibility of the technology (Lin, 2014).  
  
Amount of flexibility provided: Unlike gas turbines, electrochemical batteries do 
not have a minimum output and, moreover, they can work also as a load. The 
minimum power output of a gas turbine that meets environmental requirements is 
around 50%. Below that level, the temperature of the combustion goes down, which 
means less conversion of CO to CO2 (Wartsila, n.d.). Thus, if we compare a gas 
turbine with a battery with the same nameplate capacity, the flexibility that the battery 
can provide will be between three and four times larger. Comparing a 100MW gas-
fired peaker plant with a 100MW battery, a battery could offer 200MW (100MW as 
generator and 100 MW as load) of flexibility whereas the gas turbine could only 
provide around 50MW. 
 
Utilization of the plant: If gas-fired peaker plants are only used for flexibility 
purposes and start-ups and shutdowns account for around 20% of their operation 
hours (Lin, 2014), their load factor is rarely above 10% (Lyons, 2014). On the other 
hand, EES systems can be operating 95% of the hours due to their fast ramp 
capabilities and the possibility of providing multiple services while their peaking 
capacity is not needed. 
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Performance: EES systems respond much faster and more accurately to signals 
from the system operator when it comes to providing flexibility services. For instance, 
the ramp rate of an EES system can be up to 600 times faster than a gas-fired 
peaker plant. A battery is able to provide its maximum power in less than one 
second, whereas for a gas turbine this could take up to 10 minutes from minimum 
output (Lin, 2014).  
Overall system benefits: Due to all the benefits explained above, the installation of 
EES systems as flexibility providers increases the technical and economic efficiency 
and sustainability of the system. 
As EES systems can respond faster and more accurately as the need for flexible 
capacity increases. For instance, if the California system operator (CAISO) 
dispatched fast-response EES resources, its frequency regulation procurement costs 
could be reduced by 40% (Du and Lu, 2015, p. 100).  
Using EES allows better optimization of the operation of the available generation 
fleet, which means less ramping and part-loaded generation and, therefore, less fuel 
wasted and less air pollution. The reduction in emissions could be significant. In the 
case of California, relative to using Pacific Gas and Electric’s base load electric mix 
as the off-peak source of electricity, EES could reduce CO2 emissions per MWh by 
more than half (with even more significant reductions in nitrous oxides and carbon 
monoxide), according to Lin (2011). 
With EES, the system would avoid having costly gas-fired peak plants that are not 
producing any power during 90% of the year. For example, 20% of New York State’s 
generation capacity runs for less 3% of the year (Lyons, 2014). However, an EES 
system can be working 95% of the year providing multiple services.  
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The consumption of water, another scarce natural resource in many parts of the 
world, would also be reduced. A 100MW gas-fired peak plant would consume 30000 
litres/hour whereas an EES has little or no water usage (Lin, 2014). 
4. The value of electrical energy storage 
Calculating the value of EES is a complicated task, as the systems can access 
multiple revenue streams and the potential benefits from them depend on several 
factors such as the ownership of the asset or its location.  
The main issue when it comes to calculating the value of energy storage is that EES 
costs are typically larger than benefits from any individual grid application. Only in 
certain areas of the USA, after the implementation of Order 755 issued by FERC in 
the USA, can EES be profitable by providing only frequency regulation.  
Although EES can provide multiple services, their benefits cannot just be added 
together as each of them requires part of the operational availability of the asset. 
Assuming that there are no regulatory and market constraints, the technical potential 
of EES is obtained after optimizing the operation of the asset and the time allocated 
for each service. However, the technical potential cannot be monetized entirely 
since, in reality, market and regulatory barriers do exist. Depending on the market 
situation and the ownership of the asset, potential benefits will shrink or could even 
disappear. Moreover, there is competition to provide services as the penetration of 
EES increases. Thus the potential value of the nth unit will be lower than the value of 
the first unit. 
As mentioned previously, one of the advantages of EES is the additional benefits 
provided to the whole electricity system and the society. The problem is that, 
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currently, there is no method to evaluate these benefits and, therefore, to 
compensate EES systems for providing them. 
There are several studies that confirm this. EPRI (2013) studied the cost-
effectiveness of EES in California at the transmission and distribution level. They 
calculated the technical potential value of energy storage and compared it to the 
costs of the installation over its lifetime. The results demonstrate the points 
mentioned above. An EES can be cost-effective provided it provides multiple 
services and there are no regulatory and market constraints, with the exception of 
installations providing frequency regulation after the application of Order 755. The 
report also shows that the highest benefits are obtained from frequency regulation – 
also before the application of Order 755, T&D deferral and capacity supply.  
In the case of the UK, SBC (2013) published a comparison of the annual benefit of 
storage applications compared to the annualized cost of the installation. Again, 
individual applications do not cover the costs of the installation but a bundle of 
applications can. This is applicable to the other European countries. However, an 
equivalent measure to Order 755 has not been applied in Europe yet. Therefore, the 
possibility of providing only frequency regulation cost-effectively in Europe does not 
exist. 
Market and regulatory barriers are, together with the high cost of EES technologies, 
the main factor hindering the deployment of the technology.  
5. Market and regulatory barriers for EES in California and Europe 
The following sections analyse and compare the market and regulatory barriers 
existent in California and Europe. Three countries have been chosen as 
representative of the European situation: the UK, Germany and Spain. 
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5.1.  Inadequate definition and classification of EES 
EU legislation provides a definition for the conventional activities within the electricity 
system – generation, transmission, distribution and supply. However, electrical 
energy storage is currently not defined as a separate activity or as an asset class.  
Energy storage has been traditionally treated in the same way as generation. This 
originates from large scale PHS technology that competes with generators in the 
provision of bulk energy and balancing services. While this treatment works for large 
scale EES systems, it is not convenient for smaller scale assets which can provide 
other services. 
This is the situation in California and in Europe: EES is not clearly classified within 
the electricity system and it is usually treated as generation. This prevents utilities or 
developers from obtaining revenue by providing services under multiple 
classifications (SANDIA, 2013). The different stakeholders involved in the industry 
state recognise this as a significant issue (CAISO et al., 2014). 
EES can work as generation, load and as a T&D asset. Therefore, the treatment of 
EES as generation does not cover all its possible applications and this has 
consequences regarding the operation and the ownership of the asset  
5.2. Unbundling requirements 
The first consequence of considering EES as a generation asset is the effect of the 
unbundling requirements arising from the electricity market liberalisation process. In 
the European Union, Directive 2009/72/EC establishes the requirements for 
unbundling. These requirements were designed to prevent discrimination between 
15 | P a g e  
 
network users by integrated network owners and may effect the ability of network 
owners to capture all of the benefits of owning and operating EES6. 
This affects Transmission and Distribution System Operators (TSOs and DSOs). 
TSOs have three possible models (UKPN, 2014b): 
- Ownership unbundling (OU): This involves separate ownership of 
transmission assets from both generation and retail. 
- Independent System Operator (ISO): This involves a wholly independent 
system operator, who has no interest in the ownership of transmission, 
distribution, generation or retail assets. This allows vertical integration of 
transmission assets with generation and/or retail assets to continue. 
- Independent Transmission Operator (ITO): This specifies that transmission 
assets must be operated in a wholly separate business (with strict ring-
fencing), if it continues to be owned by a vertically integrated company. 
The following table shows the models adopted within the countries analysed: 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As EES is treated as generation, TSOs under the OU model cannot own EES 
systems. Under the ITO model, EES could be owned by it must be operated 
independently from the grid. 
The requirements for DSOs are for full legal unbundling from other parts of the 
electricity system, including generation and supply. Therefore, European 
transmission and distribution system operator licence holders cannot obtain value 
from assets that require a generation licence, such as EES.  
                                            
6 Paragraph 9 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
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There are some cases that exempt owners from holding a generation license. For 
instance, in the UK there is an exemption if the project is considered a “small 
generator”. An EES will be considered a “small generator” if the electricity that it 
provides is7: 
- under 10MW or, 
- 50MW as long as the declared net capacity is less than 100MW. 
In the case of Spain it is not necessary to apply for authorization if the generator 
output is less than 50MW8. Therefore, TSOs/DSOs could own batteries that meet 
this requirement. 
In California, since the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) issued 
Decision 13-10-040 and Decision 14-10-045, investor-owned utilities are allowed to 
own energy storage resources and, besides, they can provide generation, 
transmission and distribution services. However where they participate in more than 
one market at the same time, the cost recovery procedure still has to be clarified. 
As the CPUC admits, the existing regulatory framework does not consider storage as 
a generation asset and a transmission asset. There is a regulatory and decision 
making gap between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), CPUC, 
and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)’s transmission planning 
processes. Storage that could provide both transmission and generation functions is 
not able to take advantage of both benefits in comparison to other alternatives 
(CPUC, 2013). For instance, being a transmission asset rewarded through regulated 
                                            
7 Electricity (Class Exemptions from the Requirement for a Licence) Order 2001. 
8 Article 53 Ley 24/2013. 
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charges while also participating in energy markets is not allowed by FERC (CAISO 
et al., 2014).  
5.3. Obligation for TSOs and DSOs not to distort competition in the electricity 
markets  
Although European TSOs/DSOs are allowed to own EES systems that meet the 
requirements for a “small generator”, they have the obligation not to distort 
competition in the electricity market, as this is not their core business. These entities 
would need to buy and sell energy to charge and discharge the batteries but this 
requirement is blocking the possibility of trading in the wholesale market. This means 
that they will require a third party with a licence to participate in the wholesale market 
on behalf of the DNO/TSO able to operate the battery. This party could be part of the 
DNO/TSO, but only if it is ring-fenced appropriately (UKPN, 2014b). Adding a third 
party to the business case brings complexity (transaction costs) and requires that 
each party must make a return from the operation to make the arrangement 
worthwhile.  
 
This barrier, together with the unbundling requirements, only allows DSOs/TSOs to 
obtain value from deferring an investment in the system. They are not allowed to 
trade in electricity markets so they cannot obtain benefits from the other potential 
revenue streams. They need to add third parties through complicated contractual 
agreements that decrease the attractiveness of the investment as the benefits have 
to be split between the parties. 
Case study: UKPN Smart Network Storage Project  
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To illustrate these problems the case study of UKPN Smart Network Storage (SNS) 
Project is explained. The SNS project involves a 6MW/10MWh Lithium-ion battery 
installed at the Leighton Buzzard primary substation. It is intended to defer the 
investment needed to reinforce the grid. The project is trialling the commercial 
arrangements needed to exploit the value of the services produced by EES.  
UKPN holds a distribution licence. It owns, operates and manages three electricity 
distribution networks in the UK and it has more than eight million customers 
connected to its lines. Peak demand at Leighton Buzzard has exceeded “firm 
capacity”9 several times since 2007. Furthermore, peak demand is forecast to 
continue to grow which means that a reinforcement of the network will be needed. As 
a distribution company, UKPN is responsible for this reinforcement. The conventional 
reinforcement option would be adding a 33kV additional circuit and a third 38MVA 
transformer (UKPN, 2013).  
Instead, UKPN installed a battery with the purpose of deferring the needed upgrade 
at Leighton Buzzard. Moreover, this battery can give them access to additional 
revenues. The issue is that UKPN, to avoid distorting competition, is not allowed to 
take part in wholesale energy markets to charge/discharge the battery and operate 
the asset commercially to supply services such as frequency response. This requires 
the inclusion of two partners – Smartest Energy (SE) and Kiwi Power (KP) – in the 
business case.  
                                            
9 Firm capacity of a substation is the available capacity for that substation, given the transformer with 
the highest MVA rating having been switched out. The expected substation loads should not exceed 
the substation’s firm capacity. 
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Smartest Energy is the entity chosen to access the wholesale market to 
charge/discharge the battery. UKPN and SE have an energy supply and tolling 
agreement. Thus, SE buys and sells the energy that UKPN needs. The benefit that 
SE gets from this is a fee, which UKPN has to pay.  
The tolling agreement works in the following way: SE can take over control of the 
asset to use for buying and selling energy and get a certain outcome (pure arbitrage 
or reduction of imbalance risk) after pre-payment of a toll to UKPN. It is similar to a 
lease of the asset for a fixed (low-risk) fee. Thus, each week SE will issue a price 
together with an import/export profile which reflects when it would be profitable for 
them to schedule the use of the asset (i.e. determine its use). UKPN will compare 
this option with the other possible uses of the asset (selling ancillary services or 
providing security of supply) and, if this is the most beneficial, they will accept the 
offer from SE (UKPN, 2014a). 
Regarding the other contract, UKPN has an aggregator services agreement with KP. 
KP aggregates small distributed energy resources to be sold in the Short Term 
Operating Reserve (STOR), Firm Frequency Response and Fast Reserve markets, 
run by the National Grid.  
KP undertakes research and pricing information about the services provided. UKPN 
will notify KP about the availability of the asset and will dispatch the energy under KP 
instructions. UKPN receives a monthly report on sources of aggregation revenue 
from KP. KP charges a percentage of the revenue for its services (see UKPN, 
2014a)10. 
                                            
10 This is a simplified version of the complex arrangements between the different parties. More 
information can be found in the report published by UKPN (2014a). 
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This is a good example of the problems stated previously. Due to the unbundling 
requirements and the obligation not to distort competition, two more parties have to 
be included in the business case in order access to the multiple revenue streams 
that the battery can offer. Obviously, the project must be cost-effective for the three 
parties. Furthermore, these contracts have significant transaction costs. This 
decreases the value that UKPN could potentially obtain from its ownership of the 
asset.  
An alternative business model studied by UKPN would be opening a tender process 
for third parties that would finance, own, build and operate the asset. The third party 
would have to provide security of supply when agreed with UKPN and, the rest of the 
time, they could use the asset to access additional revenue streams. The advantage 
for UKPN is that this would reduce significantly its construction, operational and 
commercial risks in the project. However, UKPN will lose the control over the asset, 
which could lead to an overuse of it to maximise profits at the expense of meeting its 
basic requirement to manage network peak capacity in the local area. Such an 
arrangement would directly compete with conventional grid upgrades that would be 
normally supplied by the UKPN. 
While the unbundling requirements and the obligation not to distort competition affect 
mainly TSOs and DSOs, the barriers introduced in the following sections affect all 
entities. 
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5.4. Lack of markets or inadequate market design  
Some of the services that EES can provide are not rewarded properly and, in some 
cases, they are not even remunerated at all. 
Lack of data about ancillary services: Traditionally a lot of ancillary services have 
been procured under bilateral contracts. This makes it difficult for new storage 
facilities (and their investors) to value the services that they produce, or to get 
access to the market (THINK, 2012).  
Non-remunerated services: Some ancillary services have to be provided for free by 
generators as a condition to connect to the grid, e.g. voltage control and black start 
in Germany and Spain. Only if additional voltage control is needed (enhanced 
voltage control) can providers be remunerated. Primary frequency regulation in 
Spain is not remunerated either. EES systems are capable of providing these 
services but, since there is no market for them, so they cannot obtain value.  
Inadequate compensation methods: Secondly, existing compensation methods do 
not value the quality of the service provided11. In most cases, ancillary services are 
paid based on the availability of the asset to provide the service and the actual 
utilization of the asset. The faster and more accurate performance of EES systems 
providing flexibility services is not rewarded. Therefore, the current market design is 
more convenient for traditional flexibility providers. 
The following table shows the different procurement and remuneration methods for 
ancillary services in the European countries analysed: 
 
                                            
11 By quality of the service, we mean, for example, the speed of the frequency response, hence the 
new enhanced frequency response product in the UK. This product requires response within 1 second 
(rather than the 5 seconds it might take a pumped storage facility to respond). 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
California presents similar problems. The markets for ancillary services are designed 
for traditional generators. They reflect the (often low) opportunity cost of withholding 
capacity from the wholesale energy market in order to provide other electricity 
products. A storage device, on the other hand, is designed to provide ancillary 
services and will, likely, not be adequately remunerated by existing payment 
regimes. 
There are no enablers that allow operators to leverage unique characteristics of 
storage for some ancillary services (CESA, 2014). Therefore, not all potential 
benefits can be fully monetized. 
Despite the implementation of Order 755, which only affects frequency regulation, 
the other ancillary services’ compensation methods do not take into account speed 
and accuracy. This is a sign of a non-technology-neutral market that benefits 
traditional providers. 
For instance, black start (recovery after an outage) is often not remunerated at all. 
Black start might be required at anytime, though perhaps not in at all (SCE, 2011). 
Similarly, in the case of voltage control, there is no remuneration while voltage 
remains within its normal range (FERC, 2012). Such non-explicit remuneration might 
be ok for an existing conventional generator, however it is not an adequate revenue 
stream for an EES facility. 
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Californian regulators admit that such distribution grid services are not well enough 
defined and open to competition in ways that EES could reasonably be expected to 
participate (CAISO et al, 2014). 
Another issue affecting both Europe and California is that contracts are usually of a 
short-term nature, so they do not offer financial certainty about what the revenues 
from this source are going to be. The California Energy Storage Alliance (CESA, 
2014) confirms that the lack of long-term contracts is another hurdle for developers, 
as it makes financing projects difficult.  
Minimum technical requirements: As these markets were designed for traditional 
providers, minimum requirements for participating in them are a hurdle for EES 
systems. For instance, in Germany the minimum power requirement to provide 
secondary frequency regulation and spinning reserve is 5MW. In the UK, the 
minimum power is 3MW for STOR with a minimum duration of 2 hours (50MW and 
15 minutes in the case of Fast Reserve). In Spain, at least 10MW has to be offered 
to provide secondary frequency regulation and spinning reserve (National Grid, 
2015; regelleistung.net, and Ministerio de Industria, 2009). Thus, EES systems with 
less power capacity or duration cannot participate in these markets unless they are 
combined with other providers through aggregation.  
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi, 2015, p.57) 
admits this problem in its white paper about the electricity market and states that the 
balancing market will be opened to new participants.  
There are no such minimum requirements in California. 
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5.5. Lack of need for EES 
The necessity of deployment of EES is not the same in the countries analysed. While 
in the UK and California the need for EES as a source of flexibility seems clear, in 
the case of Germany and Spain it is not so evident.  
As Germany is in the centre of Europe, the German electricity market is closely 
linked to its neighbouring countries. It has an interconnection capacity of 20GW and 
this substantially reduces its need to manage supply and demand for electricity 
services within its own borders (BMWi, 2015). 
Germany has managed the integration of VRES (so far) with modest changes to its 
power system. This is because it started with strong grid capacity, flexible coal plants 
and nuclear plants and a lot of interconnection with other countries with plenty of 
flexible generation themselves. According to Martinot (2015), the expectation among 
potential investors is that there is little requirement for EES in Germany until 
renewables provide more than 40% of electrical energy (Martinot, 2015). Agora 
(2014) also states that there will be no need for EES at the transmission level in the 
medium term. However, EES could have an important role at the distribution level as 
expensive expansions of the system could be avoided.12  
Regarding Spain, it has an oversized power system. The peak demand in 2014 was 
39GW and the power installed is over 100GW (REE, 2014). This has several 
consequences. First, there are many plants that are not operating, which decreases 
energy prices and makes it difficult to obtain any return from them. This results in 
                                            
12 Neither Martinot (2015) nor Agora (2014) takes into account the additional benefits of EES, such as 
reduction of GHG emissions or the increase of the efficiency of the system. This suggests a need for 
EES to be studied more in depth, taking into account all the additional effects of their deployment. 
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more risk for investments in new installations. Second, all this unutilized capacity can 
cover the flexibility needs of the Spanish systems. The average load factor of 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) in 2014 was 51.2% (REE, 2014). This makes 
them perfect candidates to provide flexibility to the system.  
Moreover, a significant increase in the share of VRES is not expected. Unlike the UK 
or Germany, Spain does not have a target to reduce its GHG emissions beyond the 
EU requirement. Furthermore, in 2013, subsidies for renewable energies were 
removed, which reduces the attractiveness of installing new plants13. This suggests 
EES is unlikely to be needed in the next decade. 
The case of the UK is different. Its interconnection capacity is currently only 4GW – 
compared to the 20GW of Germany. At the end of 2014, the capacity installed in the 
UK was 85GW and the maximum load was 54GW (DUKES, 2015). The capacity 
margin is not as large as the one in Spain. Moreover, as a consequence of the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive14 and the nuclear policy, 14 power plants that account 
for 16.9GW are expected to shut down (EnergyUK, n.d.). Therefore, new capacity 
will be needed to cover some of these closures. 
This new capacity will consist mainly in VRES (and possibly nuclear plants) as the 
UK has to meet its target of 80% GHG emissions reductions by 2050 relative to 
199015. Therefore, the need for flexibility in the UK power system is expected to 
increase. There would be system savings arising from the installation of 2GW EES 
by 2020 (Strbac et al, 2014). National Grid is currently running (April 2016) an 
                                            
13 Real Decreto 2/2013. 
14 European Directive 2001/80/EC. 
15 Climate Change Act, 2008. 
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auction for a new enhanced frequency response product, which explicitly rewards 
the sort of very fast response that EES can provide.16 The UK one of the most 
attractive markets for EES in Europe.17 
Regarding California, significant changes are underway already. The state has 
ambitious targets for its share of electricity from renewables and it plans to retire 
(and/or repowering) 16 GW of aging gas-fired power plants (CPUC, 2013a). Against 
this background the regulator has identified the need for 4.6 GW of new flexible 
capacity, some of which could be EES. 
 
6. Why are the prospects for EES better in California than in Europe? 
As explained in the previous section, there are similar market and regulatory barriers 
in Europe and California. However, the deployment of the technology is much larger 
in California. As mentioned in the first section, there are currently 145 battery 
projects operating or announced in California, more than double the total number in 
the three EU countries analysed. The main reason is the significant progress in 
terms of regulation for EES at the national (federal) and state level in California. The 
following are the main regulatory changes that are boosting EES in California. 
6.1. FERC Order 755: Pay for Performance 
This Order, issued by the national Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
in October 2011, addresses the compensation method for frequency regulation with 
the purpose of having a non-discriminatory technology-neutral market. FERC 
requires market operators – such as the California Independent System Operator 
                                            
16 See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/Enhanced-Frequency-Response.aspx  
17 There are also significant developments in Ireland, where the regulator is currently designing 7 new 
ancillary services product markets which could provide sources of revenue for EES facilities (see 
DotEcon, 2015, for a discussion). 
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(CAISO) – to reflect in their compensation methods a capacity payment and a 
performance payment. The performance payment should reflect how fast and 
accurate is the response to the signal from the system operator. Tariff modifications 
proposed by CAISO were approved by FERC in November 2014.  
This benefits fast-response assets like energy storage as, prior to this Order, they 
were paid the same as slow-ramp generators. EPRI (2013) estimated the effect that 
this Order would have in the cost-effectiveness of EES. The benefit/cost ratio would 
increase 18% at the transmission level and 13% at the distribution level. Besides, in 
the same report, they confirm that an installation providing only frequency regulation 
would be cost-effective. 
6.1.1. FERC Order 784: Third party provision  
This order, issued in July 2013, intends to promote competition in ancillary service 
markets. FERC Order 784 takes Order 755 requires public utility transmission 
providers to account properly for speed and accuracy in ancillary services. For 
example, if storage is determined to be three times more effective than a slower-
responding fossil-based generator, then a utility that is self-providing with a slower 
generator must reserve three times the nominal capacity rating of storage (Lyons, 
2013). 
6.1.2. FERC Order 1000: Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation 
With the application of Order 1000, non-transmission alternatives (NTA) – including 
energy storage – have to be taken into account in regional transmission planning 
processes. Under FERC Order 1000, NTA projects can now compete directly with 
new transmission lines, and the costs to develop NTA-type projects are now fully 
recoverable from the rate base (Lyons, 2013). According to Lyons, FERC Order 
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1000 may create a larger market potential for EES through T&D deferral/substitution 
than Order 755 and Order 784 have created for frequency regulation. 
6.1.3. Assembly Bill 2514 
In September 2010, the AB2514 was approved by Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. The bill required the CPUC to adopt energy storage system 
procurement targets (by the end of 2015 and again by the end of 2020). 
In October 2013, the CPUC issued Decision 13-10-040 with its procurement target. It 
requires the three largest Investor Owned Utilities (IOU) – Pacific Gas and Electric 
(PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas and Electric 
(SDG&E) – to procure 1325 MW of EES systems by 2020. The quantity to be 
procured is specified for each utility at different points of interconnection 
(transmission, distribution and customer) for 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2020 (CPUC, 
2013b).  
The EES systems installed must be cost-effective. The cost-effectiveness 
assessment has to be done on a project-specific basis and utilities can propose their 
own cost-benefit methodology. 
This is the largest boost to EES globally so far and its effect will be seen not only in 
California but also internationally. The results to date are positive: 
- In November 2014, SCE awarded more than 250MW of EES systems under 
the Local Capacity Requirement procurement, which has to be added to the 
requirement to procure 90MW under the AB 2514 (SCE, 2014).  
- PG&E issued a Request for Offer (RFO) for 74MW of EES (PG&E, 2014). 
They have received more than 5000MW worth of applications which proves 
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the huge number of developers that want to participate in the Californian 
market (St. John, 2015). 
- SDG&E issued a RFO for a minimum of 25MW of EES systems but allows for 
a maximum of 800MW of EES to be procured. So, similarly to SCE, it could 
end up with far more energy storage than the minimum required by CPUC 
(SDG&E, 2014).  
California Energy Storage Roadmap (CESR) 
The CESR was developed during 2014 by CAISO, CPUC and California Energy 
Commission (CEC). The roadmap, issued in December 2014, identifies five areas 
where challenges exist: planning, procurement, rate treatment, interconnection and 
market participation. Through stakeholder engagement, barriers and possible 
solutions are proposed. The document finally presents the actions that would need to 
be taken and their priority. 
Workshops and conferences with industrial stakeholders were organised to gather 
comments from all the parties involved in the sector (including CESA, PG&E, SCE, 
SDG&E, NREL, developers, etc.).  
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7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
So, what needs to be done to improve the prospects for EES in Europe? 
Definition and classification of EES: EES definition and the services that the 
systems can provide must be clarified by legislation. Otherwise, ownership and 
operational problems will not allow owners monetize all the potential value of EES 
and investors will not have clear sight of the revenues across the lifetime of the 
asset. The fact that EES is not defined in the European legislation gives 
responsibility to national regulators to decide what the role of EES can be as long as 
they demonstrate that the unbundling requirements are met.18  
 
To reduce the uncertainty, EES must be defined in relevant European Directives. 
This requires extensive stakeholder consultation to be done effectively. The CESR 
carried out in California can be taken as an example. The final outcome should not 
compromise the fair functioning of the markets and should facilitate the selection of 
the most cost-effective solution for providing grid services. 
                                            
18 There are two examples in Europe where EES is treated differently when it comes to TSO/DSOs 
ownership and operation (UKPN, 2014b). In Italy, TSOs and DSOs are allowed to build and operate 
batteries18. They can do this where they can demonstrate that EES is the most efficient way to solve 
the problem they are addressing. In Belgium, TSOs and DSOs are allowed to have some level of 
control over EES facilities as long as market fairness and transparency is not put at risk. 
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Further study of the need for EES and the benefits from its deployment: The 
US and, particularly, California began to study EES early, and this has allowed them 
to make more progress with deployment of EES.19 The European Commission and 
each country’s government should study what the role of EES in their power systems 
could be, taking into account future developments related to renewable energy and 
grid upgrades. EES must be compared to traditional generation options, 
interconnectors and demand side response. 
 
Additional benefits for society such as the improvement of air quality, reduction of 
GHG emissions, and the improvement in the overall efficiency of the power system 
must be included and valued properly in these analyses. This may be relevant in the 
case of Germany, as current research, e.g. Agora (2014) and Martinot (2015), is not 
clear about the necessity for EES in the country but does not take into account the 
factors mentioned above.  
 
At this moment the UK, compared to Germany and Spain, is the country where 
public institutions are taking EES more into consideration, which may be a reflection 
of the actual need of the country for EES which is not so clear in the other two cases. 
                                            
19 Knowing if EES is actually needed and the benefits from its deployment compared to other 
alternatives is essential. EES started to be considered as an asset suitable for grid applications in the 
late 1990s/early 2000s in the USA. Since then, multiple studies on the topic have been undertaken. 
Some examples are as follows. A handbook of the different T&D applications of EES was published 
by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) in 2003 and 
has been updated in 2013. In 2012, DNV-KEMA together with SANDIA developed the ES-Select™ 
tool, which aims to allow comparison of the value of different storage technologies. In 2012, CPUC 
approached EPRI to study the cost-effectiveness of EES in California in connection with AB2514. The 
DOE has a substantial EES program. 
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Creation of new markets for ancillary services: One of the main reasons why it is 
not possible to monetize all the potential value of EES is because there are no 
markets for some of the specific services that they can provide. This is currently the 
case for voltage control and black start in all jurisdictions analysed – except for black 
start in the UK. This is clearly an area where the EU can learn from the procurement 
processes for EES being undertaken in California. This may be changing in the EU, 
as the UK’s national grid has recently announced a call for tenders to supply a new 
product to supply power within one second (known as Enhanced Frequency 
Response) from April 2016.20 This is specifically defined to create a market for the 
sort of fast response that only EES can provide. 
 
Some argue (THINK, 2012) that it is unlikely that voltage control and black start can 
be procured more efficiently given that it is a highly location-specific service and only 
a few units can provide the service. This could lead to abuse of market power by 
some participants. However, in future decentralised markets there will more potential 
providers such as distributed EES. Therefore, opening a market for these services 
should result in the most efficient option providing the service and cheaper 
procurement costs for the system operator. Thus, to enhance transparency and 
foster competition, the procurement method should be through tender process or 
spot market. This is important for developers to have reliable market signals in order 
to be able to estimate potential revenues. 
It will be important however that the quantity to be procured in any new competitive 
process does not exceed what is necessary, and that markets are not put in place to 
                                            
20 See http://www2.nationalgrid.com/Enhanced-Frequency-Response.aspx Accessed 19 February 
2016. 
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facilitate new technologies (such as EES) which cannot provide the required services 
at any lower cost than traditional providers (Rebours, 2007). 
Technology-neutral market design: Both existing and new markets should be 
adapted to the new technologies that can access them. They must be technology-
neutral. Markets have to be designed to capture all the value that each technology 
provides to the system. EES has the ability to provide ancillary service faster and 
more accurately than traditional generation units, and this is not reflected by market 
designs. Order 755 “Pay for Performance”, implemented in the USA, ought to be 
taken as an example. 
 
Currently, EES systems that do not meet the minimum requirements have to be 
aggregated with other assets, which reduces the monetizable value of the 
installation. This implies that the minimum requirements to participate in the market 
should be reviewed to open the market to other potential providers such as EES.  
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Country/State Li-ion batteries 
Flow 
batteries 
Lead-Acid 
batteries 
Na-based 
batteries Others Total 
California 122 9 2 7 5 145 
The UK 13 1 6 2 - 22 
Germany 16 5 2 2 4 29 
Spain 6 1 1 - 6 14 
Table 1. Electrochemical battery projects under operation or announced (DOE, 2015) 
 
Country System Operator Model 
UK 
National Grid Electricity Transmission plc OU 
Scottish Power Transmission Limited (SPTL) ITO+ 
Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Limited (SHELT) ITO+ 
Germany 
50Hertz Transmission GmbH OU 
TenneT TSO GmbH OU 
TransnetBW ITO 
Amprion GmbH ITO 
Spain Red Electrica de España SA OU 
 
Table 2. TSO models in the UK, Germany and Spain (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013) 
 
 
Table 3. Procurement and remuneration methods in the UK, Germany and Spain (Ministerio de 
Industria, 1998, 2009, 2014; Rebours et al, 2007; National Grid; regelleistung.net; Castro, 2013) 
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List of acronyms 
AB2514 Assembly Bill 2514 
AGC Automatic Generation Control 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 
CAES Compressed air storage 
CAISO California Independent System Operator 
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine 
CEC California Energy Commission 
CESA California Energy Storage Alliance 
CESR California Energy Storage Roadmap 
CONE Cost of New Entry 
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission 
CSP Concentrated Solar Plant 
DOE Department of Energy of the USA 
DSO  Distribution System Operator 
EES Electrical energy storage 
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute 
FERC  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
GHG Greenhouse gases 
IOU Investor Owned Utilities 
ISO Independent system operator 
ITO Independent transmission operator 
KP Kiwi Power 
NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
NTA Non-transmission alternative 
OATT Open Access Transmission Tariff 
OU Ownership unbundling 
PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric 
PHS Pumped hydro storage 
PV Photovoltaics 
REE Red Electrica de España 
RFO Request for Offer 
SCE Southern California Edison 
SDG&E San Diego Gas and Electric 
SE Smartest Energy 
SHELT Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Limited 
SNS Smart Network Storage 
SO System Operator 
SPTL Scottish Power Transmission Limited 
STOR Short Term Operating Reserve 
T&D Transmission and Distribution 
TSO  Transmission System Operator 
UKPN United Kingdom Power Networks 
VRES Variable renewable energy sources 
VRFB Vanadium Redox Flow Battery 
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